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which have been analysed in the literature, we are able to identify a
third effect of union wage bargaining: its impact on the Arrow effect.
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1 Introduction
What is the impact of union wage bargaining on the firm’s incentive to invest
into R&D? Obviously this question is important when we want to understand
and judge the overall impact of unionisation on the ”state” of the economy.
However, the answer to this question naturally differs depending on whether
you ask a labour union or a firm.
Labour unions will put forward that wage bargaining increases the incen-
tive for the firm to invest into research. High wages increase the revenue of
introducing a labour saving technology and thus spur R&D.1
On the contrary, firms argue that the wage increase decreases the profit
from an innovation. Consequently the incentive for performing R&D declines
and as such, research investment.
Which of these arguments is the correct or at least the dominating one?
In a Continental European context this is important to know. Many EU15
economies reform and restructure their labour relations towards the anglo-
saxion model of more market coordination. Is this a means to enhance the
research situation or will it make things even worse (compared for example
to the US)?
Plotting aggregate R&D expenditures (in % of GDP) and union wage
coverage for a set of EU15 countries and the US and Japan yields figure 1
which depicts a (insignificant) negative relationship between research invest-
ment and union wage bargaining.2 A good part of this effect is driven by
the situation in Japan and the US with large R&D expenditures and low
degree of unionisation. The impact of unionisation on research investment
within the EU15 is far from being clear (see the right panel in figure 1). The
ambiguity of the union effect is also confirmed in econometric studies, see
for example the paper of Menezes-Fihlo and Van Reenen (2003) who present
a broad survey of the empirical literature on the effect of unions and inno-
vation. They conclude that empirically, there is no consensus among these
studies in which way unions affect innovation.
The theoretical literature which analyses the relation between union wage
1Another argument which centres more on the aggregate effect of unions on innovation
goes that high wage demands foster the process of structural change since low-productivity
firms are pushed out of the market. This argument is especially popular among Scandina-
vian trade union leaders. For a formal analysis of this argument, see Agell and Lommerud
(1993).
2All figures refer to the year 2000.
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Figure 1: R&D Expenditure and Union Coverage
bargaining and research investment is also far from being unambiguous. The
early literature (see for example Grout (1984) or Ploeg (1987)) focussed very
much on the hold-up effect of the union. The basic idea is that if research
takes the form of some sunk investment, the union accrues part of the quasi-
rent generated by this investment. The firm anticipates this hold-up in the
first place and research investment declines.
More recently, however, the focus has moved away from the hold-up effect
of union wage bargaining to its effect on the strategic incentive for doing
R&D, see for example Ulph and Ulph (1994), (1998), (2001), Menezes-Fhilo
et al. (1998) or more recently Haucap and Wey (2004). Firms do not only
have a direct incentive for investing into R&D, i.e. the profit effect, but also
because the innovative firm gains a strategic advantage over its competitors.
Union wage bargaining strengthens this strategic incentive for doing research.
The wage hike associated with wage bargaining makes the position of the
non-innovating firm less attractive. This fosters investment into research.
The literature which takes the strategic effect into account, analyses the
impact of union wage bargaining exclusively within a framework of a ho-
mogeneous Cournot duopoly. Within this framework the hold-up effect as
well as the strategic effect are present (due to the oligopolistic competition).3
Which of the two effects dominates depends on the institutional setting of
the wage bargain.
Ulph and Ulph (1994) show that in a right-to-manage setting the hold-
3The ”wage differentiation hold-up” effect in the paper of Haucap and Wey (2004) is
in some ways similar to the strategic effect.
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up effect dominates. This result, however, could be reversed with efficient
bargaining, i.e. in a situation in which the bargain is over wages and em-
ployment.
Haucap and Wey (2004) focus on a right-to-manage setting, but consider
different degrees of centralisation of the wage bargain. They argue that
in general, unionisation decreases research investment of firms. The only
exception to this, is the situation with centralised wage bargaining in which
one union bargains a uniform wage for the two duopolists. In this case
unionisation will foster the incentive to invest into research.
This literature forms the starting point of this paper. However, we extend
this literature by two, in our view important, features. First, we consider
the possibility of product heterogeneity which sheds some light on how the
strategic incentive is affected by a different goods market structure. Second,
we take a different stand on modelling the process of research investment.
Ulph and Ulph (1994) model the research investment as a sealed bid
auction. Haucap and Wey (2004) consider a very simple tournament to
determine which firm is able to implement the innovation. We think this
modelling oversimplifies since it assumes that the incentive for research in-
vestment is only driven by a.) the profit when being the innovator and b.)
the profit when the competitor is the innovator.4 However, we know from the
industrial organisation literature that a more sophisticated modelling of the
research process gives rise to an additional effect that is important for R&D
investment, see for example Tirole (1988) or Reinganum (1983). This effect
is driven by the profit flow during a patent race as long as no firm has found
the innovation yet and is usually referred to as the Arrow or the replacement
effect.5
The union and innovation literature has neglected this effect although
it is important since it is an additional transmission channel through which
wage bargaining influences research investment and hence innovation. The
wage hike of the union decreases the profit flow during the patent race. This
increases the firms’ incentive to invest into innovation since they are eager to
shorten the time until the innovation is found. The Arrow effect represents
a second positive effect of union wage bargain on innovation which is the
stronger, the more heterogeneous the products of the two duopolists are. As
4These two effects are the basis for the hold-up and the strategic effect of the union.
5Arrow was the first to analyse this effect in the context of a monopoly framework, see
Tirole (1988).
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such, taking this effect into account could potentially reverse the negative
impact of union wage bargaining on innovation which have been found in the
literature, so far.
Numerical simulations of our model, however, show that even when taking
the impact of the union wage bargaining on the Arrow effect into account,
research investment will decline compared to a competitive labour market
situation. This is true for a right-to-manage as well as for an efficient bar-
gaining framework. Even introducing product heterogeneity does not modify
this results.
Section 2 presents the framework for our analysis. In section 3 we derive
the equilibrium conditions for both institutional wage bargaining set-ups
(right-to-manage and efficient bargaining) and present a numerical solution
for these equilibrium conditions. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Consumer
Following Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984) we consider an economy
which produces three goods, x1, x2 and x3. The good x3 is assumed to be the
nume´raire good in the economy, i.e. its price is normalised to one. Moreover,
we assume that this good is supplied by some competitive market which
is taken to be exogenous. The other two goods x1 and x2 are supplied
monopolistically.
Consumers are characterised by the following utility function:
U(x1, x2, x3) = α(x1 + x2)− ((x
2
1 + x
2
2) + 2γx1x2)/2 + x3, (2.1)
where utility is linear in the competitive good x3. This ensures the shadow
value of income to be one and thus, gives rise to the following linear (inverse)
demand system for x1 and x2 (see, appendix A.1):
p1 = α− x1 − γx2, (2.2)
p2 = α− x2 − γx1. (2.3)
The parameter γ depicts the substitutability between x1 and x2. For γ > (<)
0 the goods are substitutes (complements). In what follows, we will focus on
the case of γ > 0.
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The inverse demand system (in which prices are given as a function of
quantities) can be solved for the direct demand system (quantities as func-
tions of prices):
x1 = a−
1
b
p1 +
γ
b
p2, (2.4)
x2 = a−
1
b
p2 +
γ
b
p1, (2.5)
where we defined for notational convenience a := α−αγ
b
and b := 1− γ2. We
assume parameters to be such that a and b are positive.
Note that due to the symmetry of the monopolistic goods x1 and x2 in
the utility function, the inverse and direct demand functions are symmetric,
too.
2.2 Firms
The two firms under consideration produce output using labour and take
part in a productivity enhancing patent race. The production function of
both firms is symmetric and given by:
x1 = β1l1, (2.6)
x2 = β2l2, (2.7)
where βi is the input coefficient in sector i ∈ 1, 2 and li is the amount of
labour employed. Since we do not want to break up the symmetry in the
argumentation, we assume β1 = β2 which we normalise to unity. With this
specification of the production functions, it is obvious that marginal costs in
both firms are constant and equal to the wage rate wi.
Besides production, firms also engage in a (one-shot) patent race. They
invest resources in order to find a better production process which reduces the
labour requirement per unit output by a factor 0 < ∆ < 1. This resembles
somewhat the notion of an innovation in Haucap and Wey (2004). However,
we do not assume that implementation of the new process is costly (as they
do), but assume that discovering the innovation is a resource consuming
process.
We model the patent race following rather close for example Reinganum
(1983) and Tirole (1988). However, we assume that time is discrete. The in-
novation process takes the following form. At the beginning of every period t,
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firm i invests resources ri into the innovation process. With probability h(ri)
the firm is successful and can instantaneously implement the productivity
enhancing process. Note that h′(ri) > 0, h
′′(ri) < 0 and limri→∞ h(ri) < 1.
6
Thus, the firm can never be sure that it discovers the innovation at some
point in t. Note that we assume the probability process which drives discov-
ery of the innovation to be memoryless. This means that the probability of
finding the innovation in the next period is constant throughout time. This
is a standard assumption in the literature.
Once the innovation is found, it will be protected by an infinitely lasting
patent. As such, the patent race ends once a firm has discovered the innova-
tion. However, we assume that the innovation is non-drastic, i.e. the looser
of the patent race is not pushed out of the market.7
As long as no firm has won the patent race, the (operating) flow profit of
firm i is given by:
Πi = (pi − wi)xi − ri. (2.8)
Since we consider strategic interaction within the oligopoly, pi and xi are
functions of the behaviour of firm j. Thus, the flow profit of firm i will not
only be a function of wi, but also a function of the marginal cost situation
in the other firm. A short-cut way to write this is Πi(wi, wj, ri).
If firm i was the first to discover the new process, its marginal costs
would decrease and ceteris paribus the profit rate would increase. After the
innovation the marginal cost of firm i is ∆wi. Thus, the flow profit reads in
this case Πi(∆wi, wj). Remember that after the innovation is discovered, the
race ends and firm i gets an infinite stream of this flow. Thus, the present
value of winning the race (in the moment of winning) is:
∞∑
t=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
Πi(∆wi, wj) =
Πi(∆wi, wj)
ρ
, (2.9)
where ρ is the rate of time preference. In the case that firm i looses the race,
its (present value of) profits will be:
∞∑
t=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
Πi(wi,∆wj) =
Πi(wi,∆wj)
ρ
. (2.10)
6Such a function would be for example (1− (1 + ri)
−ω).
7We derive the condition for this to hold in the appendix.
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As long as no firm has won the patent race yet, the firm has to choose how
much R&D effort to invest. This investment choice is driven by maximising
the present value of profits at some point t. The present value of profits can
be derived by using the Bellman principle.8
PVit = max
ri
{
1
1 + ρ
(Π(wi, wj, ri) + E(PVit+1))
}
, (2.11)
where E(.) is the expectation operator. The present value of profits in t is
the discounted flow profit plus the expected present value in the next period.
The latter is given by:9.
(1−h(ri)−h(rj))PVit+1+h(ri)Π(∆wi, wj)ρ
−1+h(rj)Π(wi,∆wj)ρ
−1, (2.12)
which is the probability weighted stream of profits. Thanks to the assumption
of the memoryless investment process there is no interconnection between
periods, i.e. the problem does not change between t and t + 1. Thus, we
can plug-in (2.12) into (2.11) and get after some algebraic manipulations
(skipping time indices):
PVi = max
ri
{
Π(wi, wj, ri) + h(ri)Π(∆wi, wj)ρ
−1 + h(rj)Π(wi,∆wj)ρ
−1
ρ+ h(ri) + h(rj)
}
.
(2.13)
The present value of profits is the time invariant expected profit flow dis-
counted by a factor which takes the risk of winning and loosing the race into
account. When choosing the optimal amount of research investment, firm i
will maximise (2.13) taking its potential effects on later stages of the game
into account.
2.3 Unions
We assume that the labour market is dominated by firm level unions. These
bargain the wage (and employment) with the firm after the R&D choice has
been made (i.e. we focus on the situation of ex-post bargaining, see Ulph
and Ulph (1998)).
8I am grateful to Lutz Arnold for suggesting this form of presentation.
9We assume that firms cannot innovate simultaneously, i.e the probability that both
firms find an innovation is zero.
March 22, 2006 8
To keep our results comparable to the existing literature, we assume the
firm-level union to be characterised by a Stone-Geary utility function:
Vi = (wi − w¯)
θl1−θi , (2.14)
where w¯ is the wage in the competitive case which is determined by some
(exogenous) outside option. As already said, this Stone-Geary specification
is quite popular in the unionised oligopoly literature, see for example Lopez
and Naylor (2004). This is due to the fact that it is a.) quite easy to handle
and b.) that it is a flexible specification. However, we are well aware of the
fact that this specification is hard to reconcile with a utilitarian specification
of union behaviour, see Oswald (1985).
2.4 Timing
Before solving for the equilibrium in the economy some words are in order
concerning the timing of events. At the first stage of every period, firm i
chooses the amount of resources to invest into the research process, ri. This
choice is time invariant due to the fact that the process driving the discovery
of an innovation is memoryless. After having made the choice of how much
to invest, the patent race begins and it is instantaneously revealed which firm
has won. Once the patent race is over, the firm level union bargains the wage
for one period, conditional on the innovative status of the firm. At the last
stage eventually, firms produce and engage in competition. After this, the
whole sequence starts anew. When the patent race ends, the only events left
will be bargaining and production. The timing of events is visualised in figure
2. The determination of the equilibrium in the economy is dictated by this
timing structure. We use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium.
First, we determine the optimal output given the innovation status in the
economy and given the wage and research investment. Secondly, we solve the
bargaining problem again given the innovation situation and the research
investment. Using this information we can determine the profit of a firm
i for all three possible situations which in turn enables us to solve for the
equilibrium research investment strategy.
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Figure 2: Timing of Events
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Right-to-Manage
3.1.1 The Production Decision
With Cournot competition every firm maximises the present value of its
profit by choosing the amount of production that will be supplied to the
market. The choice of firm i how much to produce depends on the situation
concerning the patent race. We can distinguish three different situations:
• none of the firms has found the innovation yet,
• firm i has won the patent race and firm j has lost it, or
• firm j has won the patent race and firm i has lost it.
Since the innovation status affects marginal costs, it will affect the strategic
behaviour of every firm and thus will affect the amount of output which is
produced in the economy.
3.1.1.1 No firm has found the innovation In the situation in which
no firm has discovered the innovation, firm i chooses output such as to max-
imise the following flow profit:10
Πi = (pi − wi)xi − ri (3.1)
10The choice of output has no intertemporal effects. Thus, in determining the optimal
amount of production we can focus on the flow profit of one period. This would ceteris
paribus maximise the present value of the profit stream.
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where the price pi is by equation (2.2) a function of the output choice. By
profit maximisation the reaction curve for firm i is:
xi = 0.5 (α− γxj − wi) , (3.2)
which in turn gives the (Nash) equilibrium production of firm i in case of no
innovation:
xi =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2wi + γwj) (3.3)
xj =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2wj + γwi). (3.4)
The associated equilibrium profit is in this case:
Πi(wi, wj, ri) = xi(wi, wj)
2 − ri, (3.5)
which is the standard result in the literature, see for example Singh and
Vives (1984). As will become clear later, in the symmetric situation, wage
demands from the unions will be identical. With this, output and profit will
be identical as long as no firm has become the innovator.
3.1.1.2 Firm i has won the patent race Turning to the second situa-
tion in which firm i has won the patent race and can now produce with the
enhanced technology. The flow profit function in this case reads:
Πi(∆wi, wj) = (pi −∆wi)xi, (3.6)
which results in the following reaction curve (see, appendix A.2.1):
xi = 0.5 (α− γxj −∆wi) (3.7)
Note that since firm j lost the race, its reaction function reads:
xj = 0.5 (α− γxi − wj) (3.8)
The equilibrium amount of production is hence given by (see, appendix
A.2.1):
xi =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2∆wi + γwj), (3.9)
xj =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2wj +∆γwi). (3.10)
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The equilibrium profits for firm i and j are in turn given by:
Πi(∆wi, wj) = xi(∆wi, wj)
2, (3.11)
Πj(wj,∆wi) = xj(wj,∆wi)
2. (3.12)
3.1.2 Union Wage Bargaining
Before production can take place, every firm has to bargain the wage with a
union which represents all workers in the firm under consideration. The bar-
gaining problem is solved using the Nash bargaining solution. The bargained
wage will maximise:11
Ω = δ ln(Vi − V¯i) + (1− δ) ln(Πi − Π¯i), (3.13)
where δ reflects the bargaining power of the union. V¯i is the utility in case
no agreement is settled. We assume this utility to be zero, because with
no agreement employment is zero. Π¯i is the profit of firm i in case of no
agreement. This depends on the innovation status in the economy. As long
as no innovation has been found, firm i has invested the amount ri in advance
and has to bear these costs even if there is no production. Once the patent
race is over, firm i does not invest any resources. In this case the value of
non-agreement is zero, whereas it is −ri in the first case.
3.1.2.1 No firm has found the innovation Consider again first the
situation in which no innovation has occurred. Plugging (2.14) and (3.5) into
(3.13) and taking into account that employment equals production (xi = li)
we get:
Ω = δ ln
(
(wi − w¯)
θxi(wi, wj)
1−θ
)
+ (1− δ) ln(xi(wi, wj)
2) (3.14)
Setting the derivative of equation (3.14) with respect to wi zero gives the
first order condition for the bargained wage. This can be solved for wi (see,
the appendix A.2.2):
wi = w¯ +
θδ(2− γ)(α− w¯) + θδγ(wj − w¯)
2(2− δ)
(3.15)
11Note again that there is no intertemporal effect of the bargain. Thus, we can again
focus on a situation in which the utility and profit flow is maximised.
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This is the (wage) reaction curve of the union since both unions interact with
each other via the strategic interdependence of ”their” firms. Note that this
game between both unions i is played in strategic complements, i.e. a higher
wage wj increases the wage wi. The intuition is straightforward. A higher
wage wj implies a strategic advantage of firm i and thus, higher profits.
The union in firm i wants to participate from this strategic advantage and
increases its wage demands.
The equilibrium wage in a situation in which no firm has become the
innovator yet is given by:
wi = wj = w = w¯ +
θδ(2− γ)
2(2− δ)− θδγ
(α− w¯), (3.16)
where we assume that α > w¯. If this was not the case the economy would
break down since in the initial situation production would be too expensive.
3.1.2.2 Firm i has won the patent race Consider the situation in
which firm i is the successful innovator. Plugging (2.14) and (3.11) into
(3.13), with Π¯i = 0 and taking into account that employment is only a part
∆ of production (∆xi = li) gives:
Ω = δ ln
(
(wi − w¯)
θ (∆xi)
1−θ
)
+ (1− δ) ln(xi(∆wi, wj)
2). (3.17)
The wage curve in firm i is thus given by
wi = w¯ +
θδ(2− γ)(α−∆w¯) + θδγ(wj −∆w¯)
2∆(2− δ)
. (3.18)
The bargained wage in firm j (which lost the patent race) can be determined
by maximising
Ω = δ ln
(
(wj − w¯)
θ (xj)
1−θ
)
+ (1− δ) ln(xj(∆wi, wj)
2), (3.19)
which yields the following wage reaction curve (see, the appendix A.2.2)
wj = w¯ +
θδ(2− γ)(α− w¯) + θδγ(∆wi − w¯)
2(2− δ)
. (3.20)
As long as union bargaining power δ is zero or the weight the union attaches
to wages θ is zero, the innovation does not change the wage situation in the
economy.
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The Nash equilibrium bargained wages can be derived using (3.18) and
(3.20) (see the appendix A.2.2):
wi =
(2− γ)δθ(2(2− δ) + θδγ)
|A|
α+
2(2− γ(1 + θ))(2(2− δ)∆ + θδγ)
|A|
w¯
(3.21)
wj =
(2− γ)δθ∆(2(2− δ) + θδγ)
|A|
α+
∆2(2− γ(1 + θ))(2(2− δ) + θδγ∆)
|A|
w¯.
(3.22)
Proposition 1 The wage in the firm that wins (looses) the patent race in-
creases (decreases).
The productivity enhancing effect increases the strategic advantage of
the innovative firm over the firm which lost the patent race. This strategic
advantage implies two things 1.) opportunity costs of decreasing employment
for the winning firm are high, i.e. the wage elasticity will be low and 2.) the
profit of the winning firm will be high. Both makes the union to bargain for
a higher wage in the innovative firm.
Plugging equilibrium wages (3.21) and (3.22) into equilibrium production
(3.9) and (3.10) yields the effect of the labour saving innovation on output
in both firms of the economy and thus, the effect on employment:
xi =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2∆wi(∆, .) + γwj(∆, .)) , (3.23)
xj =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2wj(∆, .) + ∆γwi(∆, .)) . (3.24)
Proposition 2 The output of the innovating firm will unambiguously in-
crease, whereas the output of the firm that has lost the patent race will un-
ambiguously decrease.
Proof. Using the expression given in appendix A.2.2 for the equilibrium
wage differential, it is easy to see that:
∂xi
∂∆
=
2(2− δ(1 + θ))
(4− γ2)|A|
(δ(4 + θδγ2)− 8)w¯ ≤ 0 (3.25)
∂xj
∂∆
=
2(2− δ(1 + θ))
(4− γ2)|A|
(2γ(2− δ(1 + θ)))w¯ ≥ 0. (3.26)
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Let me give some intuition for proposition 2. Consider firm i which
has won the patent race. With a more efficient production process, firm i
is more competitive and gets a higher market share. On impact production
increases. The union that bargains the wage in firm i increases the bargained
wage and hence, decreases employment and production. Firm i faces two
countervailing effects. However, the direct effect (increased competitiveness)
always dominates the wage hike effect. Only in the case in which the union
is a monopoly (δ = 1) and only puts weight on wage increases (θ = 1) the
output of the winning firm does not change. The union captures all of the
innovation rents.
Firm j which lost the patent race looses market share and thus, decreases
production. However, the union is willing to take some of the burden, i.e. it
decreases its wage demands (since labour demand has become more elastic).
However, this union effect will never overcompensate the initial loss in com-
petitiveness. If δ = θ = 1, i.e. the economy is characterised by a monopoly
union which maximises the wage, the indirect and direct effect on the pro-
duction of firm j just cancel out with the consequence that firm j does not
loose market share although it lost the patent race.
In the public debate, it is sometimes put forward that innovation decreases
employment in the economy, see for example Ulph and Ulph (1998). The
employment effect of the innovation can be analysed using the results for the
output effect of innovation.
Aggregate employment in the economy is (after firm i has won the patent
race and implemented the innovation):
l = li + lj = xi∆+ xj. (3.27)
Firm j has not the chance to implement the labour saving technology, thus
the one to one relationship between employment and production is unchanged.
Firm i on the other hand introduced the labour saving technology. This im-
plies that the amount of labour needed to produce xi declines by the fraction
∆.
Aggregate employment changes due to three effects: 1.) output and
hence, employment in firm j decreases, 2.) the employment requirements
in firm i decreases and 3.) output in firm i increases. Only the latter effect
increases employment. More formally, this is:
dl =
(
∂xi
∂∆
+ xi +
∂xj
∂∆
)
d∆ R 0.
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Plugging in (3.25) and (3.26) and doing some algebraic manipulations gives:
dl
d∆
=

2(2− δ(1 + θ))
(4− γ2)|A|
w¯
(
4(γ + δ)− 8 + θδ2γ2 − 2δγ(1 + θ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+xi

 R 0.
(3.28)
Proposition 3 Employment (Unemployment) unambiguously decreases (in-
creases) with an innovation
a.) if the outside option wage w¯ is zero and
b.) if the economy is characterised by a monopoly union which is only inter-
ested in wage increases δ = θ = 1.
In both situations the wage increase in the innovating firm and the wage
decrease in the firm which lost the race are identical. This implies that
with the wage adjustment of the union the strategic position of both firms
remains unchanged and so is equilibrium output. Hence, only the labour
saving effect survives and this unambiguously decreases employment. In the
case of competitive labour markets, δ = 0, the employment effect of a labour
saving innovation is ambiguous.
3.1.3 Research Investment
At the first stage of every period, each firm has to decide how much to
invest into the research process, ri, in order to win the patent race. At this
stage the firm has rational expectations and anticipates what happens at the
bargaining stage and at the production/competition stage.
Deriving the first order condition for the choice of ri using (2.13) yields:
12
∂PVi
∂ri
=
(h′(ri)Πi(∆wi, wj)ρ
−1 − 1) [ρ+ h(ri) + h(rj)]
(ρ+ h(ri) + h(rj))2
−h′(ri) [Πi(wi, wj, ri) + h(ri)Πi(∆wi, wj)ρ
−1 + h(rj)Πi(wi,∆wj)ρ
−1]
(ρ+ h(ri) + h(rj))2
= 0,
(3.29)
⇔ h′(ri)
(
Πi(∆wi, wj)ρ
−1 − PVi
)
= 1, (3.30)
12Equilibrium output and hence equilibrium profit is not affected by the choice of ri.
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where the left-hand side of this equation depicts the (expected) marginal
gain due to the increased investment in research. The marginal gain consists
of the increased probability of making an innovation times the net value of
being an innovator (i.e. the difference between the state value of being an
innovator and the state of the patent race being open). The marginal loss
associated with an increase in research expenditures depicts the right-hand
side.
Equation (3.30) enables us to analyse the effects of unionisation, under-
stood as an increase in bargaining power, on the optimal amount of research
investment of the firm. Remember that, because unions bargain the wage at
later stages, profits (independently of the innovative status) are a function
of (inter alia) bargaining power δ. Totally differentiating (3.30) in ri and δ
gives:
h′′(ri)
(
Πi(∆wi, wj)ρ
−1 − PVi
)
dr+h′(ri)
(
∂Πi(∆wi, wj)
∂δ
ρ−1 −
∂PVi
∂δ
)
dδ = 0.
(3.31)
Plugging in the expressions for Π and PVi and taking advantage of the fact
that we consider a symmetric equilibrium in which ri = rj = r yields:
−
h′′(r)
h′(r)
(
Πi(∆wi, wj)ρ
−1 − PV
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dr
dδ
=
2ρ−1
(
1−
h(r)
ρ+ 2h(r)
)
∂xi(∆wi, wj)
∂ δ
xi(∆wi, wj)
−2ρ−1
h(r)
ρ+ 2h(r)
∂ xi(wi,∆wj)
∂δ
xi(wi,∆wj)
−2
∂x
∂δ
x
(3.32)
Equation (3.32) depicts the three different, possibly countervailing, effects of
unionisation on optimal research investment.
1. The first effect is the well-known hold-up problem as for example for-
malised by Grout (1984) or Ploeg (1987). In case the firm is the winner
of the patent race, the union is able to capture some of the innovation
rent and thus could ceteris paribus decrease output and profits. This
decreases the incentive for the firm to invest resources into the patent
race.
March 22, 2006 17
2. The second effect is due to the impact of unionisation in the case of
loosing the patent race. In this case (increased) unionisation could
also decrease profits. This, however, increases the incentive to invest
into research since the only way to escape this threat is to become
the innovator (Ulph and Ulph (1998) refer to this as the competitive
threat).
3. The third effect refers to the profit flow during the race. In this case
unionisation decreases profits, too. Thus, unionisation is more costly,
the longer the race takes. With this the incentive to shorten the race,
i.e. invest more resources into the research process increases (”nega-
tive” Arrow effect).
The model is characterised by a complex strategic structure since there is
oligopolistic competition in the goods market as well as in the market of
the upstream supplier (the union). Both interact with each other and hence,
influence the investment decision. We are not able to determine algebraically
the sign of the net effect of unionisation on the investment decision of the firm.
Instead, we will present a numerical simulation of the model which shows the
effect of bargaining power on optimal research investment and which depicts
how this relation changes due to a change in product heterogeneity.
Consider an economy which is characterised by the following research
process h(r) = (1− (1 + r)−ω) and by the following parameter vector {w¯ =
1, α = 8w¯, ρ = 0.015,∆ = 0.9, ω = 0.5}.13 With this we are able to calculate
optimal research investment as a function of bargaining power.14. The result
of these calculations is shown in figure 3. The thick, dashed (thin, straight)
line is optimal research investment as a function of bargaining power in the
case of γ = 0 (γ = 1).
Proposition 4 Research investment in the situation with two monopolists
(γ = 0) is larger than in the homogenous duopoly case (γ = 1).
This seems counterintuitive, but this property is due to the fact that a de-
crease in γ has two different effects. First, the profit when being the innovator
13The form of the research process we consider has the unfavourable property that since
h′(0) < ∞ situations exist in which the marginal incentive to invest is smaller than the
marginal costs. We only consider parameter values which rule out these corner solutions.
The reason why we have to stick to this research process is purely of technical nature.
14All calculations have been performed with Mathematicar 5.1. The notebooks are
available upon request.
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Figure 3: The impact of Unionisation on R&D Investment - Right-to-manage
increases (since there will be less competition). Second, the value of not hav-
ing innovated (i.e. the present value) increases, too. However, the first effect
dominates since the effect of less competition on the present value are of
second-order due to discounting.
Proposition 5 The effect of unionisation (=increased bargaining power) on
optimal research investment is negative, independent of the degree of hetero-
geneity of the duopoly.
The direct hold-up effect is never compensated by the Arrow effect or the
strategic effect. Given a certain amount of bargaining power, the Arrow
effect increases with a decrease in γ, however, the strategic effect decreases.
Hence, if unionisation decreases research investment in the situation of a
homogenous duopoly, this will also be true when the economy moves to the
polar case of two monopolists. This generalises results found for example in
Ulph and Ulph (1994).
Although the different market structure (in the form of different γ) does
not affect the qualitative effects of unionisation on equilibrium research in-
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vestment, it has however quantitative effects. The strength of an increase in
unionisation is larger in the case of γ = 0 than in the case of a homogenous
duopoly.15 We have argued above that the positive incentive effects of union
wage bargaining is hardly affected by changes in γ. This is due to the fact
that for example an increase in γ increases the strategic effect, but at the
same time decreases the Arrow effect. Thus, the hold-up effect is the main
driving force for unionisation to affect research. But this increases with a
decrease in γ, hence the union effect is stronger with γ = 0 compared to a
situation of γ = 1.
3.2 Efficient Bargaining
3.2.1 The Production Decision
In a situation in which the union and the firm efficiently bargain over wages
and employment, the firm cannot unilaterally decide over production as in
the previous section. In contrast equilibrium production will be determined
via the maximisation of a Nash product. As in the right-to-manage case we
have to distinguish situations in which no firm has found an innovation and
situations in which the patent race is over, i.e. one firm has won the race.
3.2.1.1 No firm has found the innovation Assuming union utility
and bargaining power to be the same as in the situation with the right-to-
manage regime, the Nash product reads:
Ω = (Vi(wi, li))
δ((pi(xi, xj)− wi)li)
(1−δ), (3.33)
where the outside option of the union is V¯i = 0 and the outside option of the
firm is Π¯i = −ri. During the bargain the union as well as the firm take the
price effect into account and assume the output of the other oligopolist as
given (=Nash equilibrium).
Bargained employment (=production) in this case is given by (see, ap-
pendix A.3.1):
xi = χ
−1
1 (α− γxj − wi), (3.34)
where χ1 :=
(
1 + 1−δ
1−δθ
)
which is the reaction function of the firm in the
efficient bargaining case. Note that this reaction function is identical to the
15The slope of the dashed line exceeds that of the straight line. Note that we do not
have to rely to this ”eye-ball” proof, but have numerically simulated the different slopes.
We skipped these results for lack of space, however they are available on request.
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one in the right-to-manage situation for χ−1i = 0.5. This is the case with
union bargaining power δ equal to zero. With any positive bargaining power
χ−11 will exceed 0.5. Thus, output would ceteris paribus increase with efficient
bargaining. This is due to the fact that employment is not restrained by the
labour demand curve, but will be on the contract curve (see, e.g. Booth
(1995)).
Using the reaction curves, we can determine equilibrium output under
efficient bargaining:
xi =
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1wi + γwj) (3.35)
xj =
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1wj + γwi) . (3.36)
Equilibrium profit of firm i is hence (using the endogenous demand rela-
tion and equilibrium output):
Πi(wi, wj, ri) = (χ1 − 1)x
2
i − ri. (3.37)
Equations (3.34) and (3.37) depict two properties which distinguish the situ-
ation of firms in the efficient bargaining case from that with right-to-manage.
First, since χ−11 > 0.5 the reaction curve of the firm will be steeper in the
efficient bargaining case. Second, operating profits is not squared output,
but only a part of it. Additionally, this share which the firm can keep is
decreasing in union bargaining power δ.
3.2.1.2 Firm i has won the patent race In the case of firm i being
the winner of the patent race, the production function in this firm changes
to xi = ∆
−1li. Consequently, the Nash product for the determination of
bargained employment changes to:
Ω = (Vi(wi, li))
δ((pi(xi, xj)∆
−1 − wi)li)
(1−δ). (3.38)
The reaction function for the firm which won the patent race is given by:
xi = χ
−1
1 (α− γxj −∆wi). (3.39)
The reaction function for firm j is not affected by the discovery of the inno-
vation and is thus given by (an appropriate modification of) (3.34).
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As such, equilibrium output is:
xi =
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1∆wi + γwj) (3.40)
xj =
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1wj + γ∆wi) . (3.41)
In this case, the equilibrium (flow) profit of the firm that won and lost the
patent race, respectively, is given by:
Πi(∆wi, wj) = (χ1 − 1)xi(∆wi, wj)
2, (3.42)
Πj(wj,∆wi) = (χ1 − 1)xj(wj,∆wi)
2. (3.43)
3.2.2 Union Wage Bargaining
The union and the firm simultaneously bargain employment and the wage.
During the wage bargain, employment can be assumed fixed (in order to
determine a Nash equilibrium). This is true since employment and wage
combinations need not to be on the labour demand curve.
3.2.2.1 No firm has found the innovation The Nash product which
is used to determine the bargained wage is the same as in the previous sec-
tion, given by (3.33). Maximisation yields the bargained wage in firm i (see
appendix A.3.2).
wi = w¯ +
δθ(χ1 − γ)(α− w¯) + δθγ(wj − w¯)
(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ) + χ1δθ
. (3.44)
The bargained wage will be a mark-up on the outside wage w¯. This is similar
to the right-to-manage case. However, it is ambiguous whether the bargained
wage will be smaller or larger than that of the right-to-manage case.
The wage reaction curves determine the equilibrium wages which are:
w = wi = wj = w¯ +
δθ(χ1 − γ)(α− w¯)
(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ) + δθ(χ1 − γ)
. (3.45)
With the wages being identical in the two firms, employment will be identical,
too. This is at least true as long as no innovation has been found.
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3.2.2.2 Firm i has won the race To find the bargained wage in firm i,
we have to maximise the Nash product (3.38) with respect to the wage wi.
This yields:
∆wi = ∆w¯ +
δθ(χ1 − γ)(α−∆w¯) + δθγ(wj −∆w¯)
(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ) + χ1δθ
. (3.46)
As in the previous section, it is again true that the Nash product for
the firm that lost the patent race does not change. Nevertheless, the wage
reaction curve is affected by the innovation. Output (and as such profits)
of firm j decreases with firm i implementing the superior technology. Thus,
the size of the pie which could be shared between firm and union decreases.
This is taken into account by the union. The bargained wage will be given
by (see, appendix A.3.2):
wj = w¯ +
δθ(χ1 − γ)(α− w¯) + δθγ(∆wi − w¯)
(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ) + χ1δθ
. (3.47)
Both wage reaction functions can be solved for equilibrium wages:
wi =
(χ1 − γ)δθ(χ2 + δθγ)
|B|
α+
(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ)(χ2∆+ δθγ
|B|
w¯ (3.48)
wj =
∆(χ1 − γ)δθ(χ2 + δθγ)
|B|
α+
∆(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ)(χ2 + δθγ∆)
|B|
w¯. (3.49)
The structure of the equilibrium is identical to the one in the right-to-
manage framework. Equilibrium wages determine equilibrium employment
which in turn determines equilibrium output. Comparative static results in
the efficient bargaining case are by and large identical to the ones in the
previous section.
Proposition 6 With efficient bargaining, the wage in the firm that won
(lost) the patent race increases (decreases). This effect is the stronger the
larger the efficiency effect of the innovation is.
Proof. Straightforward by differentiation of (3.48) and (3.49) with respect
to ∆.
Using equilibrium wages and equilibrium production, we are able to de-
termine the output effects of innovation in each firm and we can analyse
the effect on aggregate employment. As in the economy with union wage
bargaining and right-to-manage, we get the following:
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Proposition 7 Output in the winning firm increases whereas it decreases in
the firm which lost the patent race.
Proof. With the help of equations (A.60) and (A.61) it is easy to see that:
∂xi
∂∆
=
∆(1− δθ)
|B|
(δθγ2 − χ1χ2) ≤ 0
∂xj
∂∆
=
∆(1− δθ)
|B|
(χ2δ − δθγχ1) ≥ 0.
Since the change in aggregate employment in the situation in which firm
i won the patent race is given by:
dl =
(
∂xi
∂∆
+ xi +
∂xi
∂∆
)
,
we can use the result of proposition 7 and get after some manipulations an
expression for the change in employment caused by an innovation:
dl
d∆
=
∆(1− δθ)
|B|
(δθγ2 + χ2δ − χ1χ2 − δθγχ1)w¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+xi R 0. (3.50)
The aggregate employment effect of an innovation again is ambiguous. But
with equation (3.50) it is easy to see that the results from proposition 3 also
hold true with efficient bargaining.
3.2.3 Research Investment
The research investment decision does not change in the efficient bargaining
case compared to the right-to-manage situation. Also in this case, equation
(3.30) must hold and the union has the same general effects as put forward
in equation (3.32). Again, we cannot analytically solve for equilibrium R&D
investment and have to rely to a numerical simulation. Using the same
parameter vector as in the previous section with right-to-manage yields a
relation between r and δ for γ = 0 and γ = 1 as shown in figure 4. Note that
this relation is unaffected by changes in γ.
Concerning the R&D effects of union wage bargaining, the efficient bar-
gaining case exhibits the same results as the right-to-manage case. However,
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Figure 4: The Impact of Unionisation on R&D Investment - Efficient Bar-
gaining
there is one exception. The effects are qualitatively and quantitatively in-
dependent of the goods market situation. This is because the union will
capture all of the additional monopoly rents generated by a larger product
heterogeneity. Thus, profits (in any case) do not change with a change in γ.
The same is true for optimal investment into R&D.
Using the simulation for research investment with right-to-manage and
with efficient bargaining, we can compare a.) the effect of the different bar-
gaining institutions on optimal research investment and b.) the effect of an
increase of bargaining power within the different institutional settings. This
is done in figure 5 assuming γ = 1.
Proposition 8 Research investment in the right-to-manage case will in gen-
eral exceed that of the efficient bargaining case. Only with no unionisation
investment decision will be identical within both institutional settings.
At first glance, this proposition is counter-intuitive since output in the effi-
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Figure 5: The Impact of Unionisation on R&D Investment - Right-to-Manage
vs. Efficient Bargaining
cient bargaining case is larger than in the right-to-manage situation.16 How-
ever, the union is able to bargain for a larger piece of the pie. Thus, although
there is an output expansion, the profit in the efficiency bargaining case is
smaller than that in the right to manage framework. This decreases the
incentive to invest into R&D.
Proposition 9 Unionisation, i.e. increased bargaining power, has larger
effects on research investment in the efficient bargaining than in the right-to-
manage case.
The different strength of unionisation under efficient bargaining compared
to a right-to-manage setting is due to the fact that the hold-up effect in
the efficient bargaining case is stronger compared with right-to-manage. An
increase in δ has a direct effect on profits by increasing the wage demands
of the union. In addition an increase in δ also implies that firms only get
16With efficient bargaining, points on the contract curve will be realised. With Stone-
Geary preferences, this will be positively sloped, hence for all w > w¯ employment will be
larger compared to situations on the labour demand curve, see for example Booth (1995).
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a smaller share of produced output as profit. This is true independently of
whether the firm won or lost the patent race or no innovation has occurred.
Thus, the disincentive effect of unionisation in the efficient bargaining case
is stronger than with right-to-manage.
4 Summary and Conclusion
This paper researches into the question of the effect of union wage bargain-
ing on the firm’s incentive to invest into R&D. We use a framework with
two dupolists who produce heterogeneous goods, invest resources into re-
search and bargain the wage with the upstream supplier, the labour union.
The model accounts for different institutional bargaining frameworks, namely
right-to-manage and efficient bargaining. The R&D investment is modelled
as a patent race during which each firm invests resources to find a produc-
tivity enhancing technology. Once this is found the patent race ends and the
winning firm is protected by an infinitely lasting patent.
We identify three channels through which union wage bargaining affects
the incentive for performing research. The union gives rise to a hold-up
problem since it will capture some of the innovation rents. This effect is neg-
ative. However, the existence of the union strengthens the strategic incentive
to perform an innovation. Loosing the patent race is less ”attractive” than
without union wage bargaining. This effect is positive. Additionally, the
union gives rise to a third effect which is again positive. The union decreases
the profit of the firm during the patent race and hence decreases the replace-
ment or Arrow effect. This latter effect has not been clearly identified in the
literature we are aware of.
The overall effect of unionisation on R&D investment cannot analytically
be determined within the model. As such, we have to rely on numerical
simulations. Nevertheless, this numerical exercise offers some interesting
insights on the relative strength of the different union effects.
The central result of the paper is that union wage bargaining will unam-
biguously decrease the amount of resources which firms want to invest into
the research process. Thus, the hold-up effect always dominates. This is even
true for the extreme case in which we consider two monopolists. The Arrow
effect will be very strong in this situation, however, as product heterogeneity
increases, the strategic incentive for performing research decreases. In sum,
the hold-up effect of the union always dominates.
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Another interesting question that comes up is whether a different institu-
tional bargaining set-up affects the results concerning R&D investment. To
analyse this, we have simulated the effect of increased bargaining power in a
setting with right-to-manage and one with efficient bargaining. Qualitative,
both institutional settings yield the same results, however quantitatively they
perform differently. The negative effect of union wage bargaining in the ef-
ficient bargaining case will be larger than in the right-to-manage situation.
This is because with efficient bargaining the hold-up problem is much more
severe than in the right-to-manage situation.
The whole analysis has been performed within a framework in which
firms behave Cournot-like and only set quantities. We know, however, that
the effect of union wage bargaining on firm profits are not symmetric between
Cournot and Bertrand behaviour. As such, it would be interesting to analyse
the effect of union wage bargaining on the incentive to perform research in a
setting in which firms behave Bertrand-like. Moreover, it would be interesting
to analyse whether product heterogeneity and considering the Arrow effect
would modify the results concerning centralisation, as analysed in Haucap
and Wey (2004). We leave these questions for further research.
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A Referees Appendix
A.1 The Linear Demand System
Consumers choose the amounts of x1, x2 and x3 which maximise the utility
function s.t. the budget constraint Y = p1x1+p2x2+x3. The optimal choice
problem is solved using standard maximisation techniques:
L = α(x1 + x2)− (β(x
2
1 + x
2
2) + 2γx1x2)/2 + x3 + λ (Y − p1x1 − p2x2 − x3) .
(A.1)
This gives rise to the following foc:
∂L
∂x1
= α− x1 − γx2 − λp1 = 0 (A.2)
∂L
∂x2
= α− x2 − γx1 − λp2 = 0 (A.3)
∂L
∂x3
= 1− λ = 0 (A.4)
∂L
∂λ
= Y − p1x1 − p2x2 − x3 = 0 (A.5)
Using equations (A.2)-(A.4) gives the linear inverse demand system stated
in the text.
A.2 Right-to-Manage Equilibrium
A.2.1 Production Decision
A.2.1.1 No Firm has found the Innovation
Πi = (pi − wi)xi − ri, (A.6)
⇔ Πi(wi, wj) = (α− xi − γxj − wi)xi − ri. (A.7)
Maximising this with respect to xi gives:
∂Πi(wi, wj)
∂xi
= −xi + α− xi − γxj − wi = 0 (A.8)
⇔ xi = 0.5 (α− γxj − wi) (A.9)
The two reaction curves in matrix notation read:(
2 γ
γ 2
)(
xi
xj
)
=
(
α− wi
α− wj
)
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The solution to this equilibrium system is given by:
xi =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2wi + γwj) (A.10)
xj =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2wj + γwi), (A.11)
which is the equation stated in the text as (3.3) and (3.4). Using the equation
for inverse demand (2.2) and the equation for equilibrium output, we can
determine equilibrium profits as function of the wage.
A.2.1.2 Firm i has discovered the Innovation
Πi(∆wi, wj) = (pi −∆wi)xi, (A.12)
⇔ Πi(∆wi, wj) = (α− xi − γxj −∆wi)xi. (A.13)
Maximising this with respect to xi gives:
∂Πi(∆wi, wj)
∂xi
= −xi + α− xi − γxj −∆wi = 0 (A.14)
⇔ xi = 0.5 (α− γxj −∆wi) (A.15)
Firm j maximises:
Πj(wj,∆wi) = (pj − wj)xj, (A.16)
⇔ Πi(wj,∆wi) = (α− xj − γxi − wj)xj. (A.17)
Maximising this w.r.t. to xj gives:
∂Πj(wj,∆wi)
∂xi
= −xj + α− xj − γxi − wj = 0 (A.18)
∂Πj(wj,∆wi)
∂xi
= −xj + pj − wj = 0 (A.19)
⇔ xj = 0.5 (α− γxi − wj) (A.20)
The two reaction curves in matrix notation now read:(
2 γ
γ 2
)(
xi
xj
)
=
(
α−∆wi
α− wj
)
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Solving this gives:
xi =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2∆wi + γwj) (A.21)
xj =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2wj +∆γwi), (A.22)
which is (3.9) and (3.10) in the text.
A.2.2 Wage Bargaining
A.2.2.1 No Firm has found the Innovation
∂Ω
∂wi
= δ
1
Vi
(
θ(wi − w¯)
θ−1x1−θi + (1− θ)x
−θ
i
∂xi
∂wi
(wi − w¯)
θ
)
+(1− δ)
1
x2i
2xi
∂xi
∂wi
= 0
(A.23)
⇔
∂Ω
∂wi
= δ
(
θ
wi
wi − w¯
+ (1− θ)
∂xi
∂wi
wi
xi
)
+ 2(1− δ)
∂xi
∂wi
wi
xi
= 0 (A.24)
⇔ δθ
wi
wi − w¯
+ ((1− θ)δ + 2(1− δ))
(
−
2
4− γ2
wi
(4− γ2)−1((2− γ)α− 2wi + γwj)
)
= 0
(A.25)
⇔ wi = w¯ +
θδ((2− γ)α− 2wi + γwj)
2(2− δ − δθ)
(A.26)
wi
(
1 +
θδ
(2− δ − δθ)
)
= w¯ +
θδ(2− γ)α+ θδγwj
2(2− δ − δθ)
(A.27)
wi =
2− δ − δθ
2− δ
w¯ +
θδ(2− γ)α+ θδγwj
2(2− δ)
(A.28)
wi = w¯ +
θδ(2− γ)(α− w¯) + θδγ(wj − w¯)
2(2− δ)
, (A.29)
i.e. the wage is a mark-up over some alternative income. The mark-up inter
alia is a function of the bargaining power and the wage elasticity of labour
demand. This is exactly the same wage equation as in Lopez and Naylor
(2004).
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A.2.2.2 Firm i has discovered the Innovation
∂Ω
∂wi
= δ
1
Vi
(
θ(wi − w¯)
θ−1 (∆xi)
1−θ + (1− θ) (∆xi)
−θ∆
∂xi
∂wi
(wi − w¯)
θ
)
+(1− δ)
1
x2i
2xi
∂xi
∂wi
= 0
(A.30)
⇔
∂Ω
∂wi
= δ
(
θ
wi
wi − w¯
+ (1− θ)
∂xi
∂wi
wi
xi
)
+ 2(1− δ)
∂xi
∂wi
wi
xi
= 0 (A.31)
⇔ δθ
wi
wi − w¯
+ ((1− θ)δ + 2(1− δ))
(
−
2∆
4− γ2
wi
(4− γ2)−1((2− γ)α− 2∆wi + γwj)
)
= 0
(A.32)
wi − w¯ =
θδ ((2− γ)α− 2∆wi + γwj)
2∆(2− δ − δθ)
(A.33)
wi =
(2− γ)θδ
2∆(2− δ)
α+
θδγ
2∆(2− δ)
wj +
(2− δ(1 + θ))
(2− δ)
w¯, (A.34)
which can be rewritten to keep it comparable to the wage bargain in the
no-innovation situation:
wi = w¯ +
θδ(2− γ)(α−∆w¯) + θδγ(wj −∆w¯)
2∆(2− δ)
(A.35)
The bargained wage in firm j (conditional that firm i is the innovator)
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reads:
∂Ω
∂wj
= δ
1
Vj
(
θ(wj − w¯)
θ−1x1−θj + (1− θ)x
−θ
j
∂xj
∂wj
(wj − w¯)
θ
)
+(1− δ)
1
x2j
2xj
∂xj
∂wj
= 0
(A.36)
⇔
∂Ω
∂wj
= δ
(
θ
wj
wj − w¯
+ (1− θ)
∂xj
∂wj
wj
xj
)
+ 2(1− δ)
∂xj
∂wj
wj
xj
= 0 (A.37)
⇔ δθ
wj
wj − w¯
+ ((1− θ)δ + 2(1− δ))
(
−
2
4− γ2
wj
(4− γ2)−1((2− γ)α− 2wj + γ∆wi)
)
= 0
(A.38)
wj − w¯ =
θδ((2− γ)α− 2wj + γ∆wi)
2(2− δ − δθ)
(A.39)
wj =
(2− γ)θδ
2(2− δ)
α+
θδγ∆
2(2− δ)
wi +
(2− δ(1 + θ))
(2− δ)
w¯, (A.40)
which can again be rewritten to yield:
wj = w¯ +
θδ(2− γ)(α− w¯) + θδγ(∆wi − w¯)
2(2− δ)
(A.41)
We can use equations (A.34) and (A.40) to solve for the equilibrium wages
in the case of firm i winning the patent race. Rewriting the equilibrium wage
system in matrix notation gives:(
2∆(2− δ) −θδγ
−θδγ∆ 2(2− δ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
(
wi
wj
)
=
(
(2− γ)θδα+ 2∆(2− δ(1 + θ))w¯
(2− γ)θδα+ 2(2− δ(1 + θ))w¯
)
The determinant of the coefficient matrix A is given by:
|A| =
(
4(2− δ)2 − (θδγ)2
)
∆ > 0.
With this the equilibrium wages in the right-to-manage case with firm i
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winning the patent race are given by:
wi =
(2− γ)δθ(2(2− δ) + θδγ)
|A|
α+
2(2− γ(1 + θ))(2(2− δ)∆ + θδγ)
|A|
w¯
(A.42)
wj =
(2− γ)δθ∆(2(2− δ) + θδγ)
|A|
α+
∆2(2− γ(1 + θ))(2(2− δ) + θδγ∆)
|A|
w¯.
(A.43)
Note that since ∆ < 0, the wage in the innovative firm will be larger than that
in the loosing firm. This is due to the fact that the union in the innovative
firm is able to capture some of the innovation rent by raising the wage.
Using the expressions for the equilibrium wages, an expression for the
following wage differentials (which become important when analysing the
equilibrium amount of production and i.e. the equilibrium profit):
γwj − 2∆wi = (γ − 2)∆
(2− γ)δθ(2(2− δ) + θδγ)
|A|
α+
2(2− γ(1 + θ))∆(2(2− δ)(γ − 2∆) + θδγ(∆γ − 2))
|A|
w¯
γ∆wi − 2wj = (γ − 2)∆
(2− γ)δθ(2(2− δ) + θδγ)
|A|
α+
2(2− γ(1 + θ))∆(2(2− δ)(γ∆− 2) + θδγ(γ − 2∆))
|A|
w¯
A.2.3 Non-Drastic Innovation
For the innovation to be non-drastic, equilibrium production of the firm
which lost the patent race must be non-zero. Consider firm i has won the
race, thus the condition for the innovation to be non-drastic is:
xj =
1
4− γ2
((2− γ)α− 2∆wi + γwj) > 0 (A.44)
⇔ (2− γ)α− (2− γ)∆
(2− γ)δθ(2(2− δ) + θδγ)
|A|
α+
2(2− γ(1 + θ))∆(2(2− δ)(γ − 2∆) + θδγ(∆γ − 2))
|A|
w¯ > 0,
(A.45)
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A.3 Efficient Bargaining Equilibrium
A.3.1 Production Decision
A.3.1.1 No firm has found the Innovation
Ω = (Vi(wi, li))
δ((pi(xi, xj)− wi)li)
(1−δ) (A.46)
⇔ log Ω = δ log Vi(wi, li) + (1− δ) log(pi(xi, xj)− wi) + (1− δ) log li
(A.47)
Employment and thus production is in the efficient bargaining case deter-
mined via the bargain between the firm and the union given all other en-
dogenous variables.
∂log Ω
∂li
= δV −1i (1− θ)
Vi
li
+ (1− δ)(pi(xi, xj)− wi)
−1(−1) + (1− δ)l−1i = 0
⇔ δ(1− θ)l−1i + (1− δ)l
−1
i = (1− δ)(pi(xi, xj)− wi)
−1
⇔ li
1
1− δθ
=
1
1− δ
(pi(xi, xj)− wi)
⇔ xi
1− δ
1− δθ
= α− xi − γxj − wi
⇔ xi
(
1 +
1− δ
1− δθ
)
= α− γxj − wi
,
which gives the reaction curve for firm i given no innovation has been found:
xi = χ
−1
1 (α− γxj − wi), (A.48)
with 1 < χ1 := 1 +
1−δ
1−δθ
< 2.
Note the similarity to the reaction curve in the right-to-manage case.
Equation (A.48) implicitly constitutes a system of two equations which
can be solved for the amount of production in the two firms. The two reaction
curves in matrix notation now read:(
χ1 γ
γ χ1
)(
xi
xj
)
=
(
α− wi
α− wj
)
The solution of the system is eventually:
xi =
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1wi + γwj) (A.49)
xj =
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1wj + γwi) . (A.50)
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A.3.1.2 Firm i has found the Innovation In this case the production
function of firm i changes to xi∆ = li.
Ω = (Vi(wi, li))
δ((pi(xi, xj)∆
−1 − wi)li)
(1−δ) (A.51)
⇔ log Ω = δ log Vi(wi, li) + (1− δ) log(pi(∆
−1li, xj)∆
−1 − wi) + (1− δ) log li
(A.52)
Employment and thus production is in the efficient bargaining case deter-
mined via the bargain between the firm and the union given all other en-
dogenous variables, especially the wage since firm and union bargain simul-
taneously.
∂log Ω
∂li
= δV −1i (1− θ)
Vi
li
+ (1− δ)(pi(∆
−1li, xj)∆
−1 − wi)
−1∆−1(−∆−1) + (1− δ)l−1i = 0
⇔ δ(1− θ)l−1i + (1− δ)l
−1
i = (1− δ)(pi(∆li, xj)∆
−1 − wi)
−1∆−1∆−1
⇔ (1− δθ)l−1i = (1− δ)∆
−1(pi(∆li, xj)−∆wi)
−1
⇔
li
∆
1
1− δθ
=
1
1− δ
(pi(xi, xj)−∆wi)
⇔ xi
1− δ
1− δθ
= α− xi − γxj −∆wi
⇔ xi
(
1 +
1− δ
1− δθ
)
= α− γxj −∆wi
⇔ xiχ1 = α− γxj −∆wi,
which gives the reaction curve for firm i when having won the patent race:
xi = χ
−1
1 (α− γxj −∆wi), (A.53)
Since the production situation of firm j does not change compared to the
previous paragraph, we can again solve the amount of production in firm i
and j using the following system:(
χ1 γ
γ χ1
)(
xi
xj
)
=
(
α−∆wi
α− wj
)
whose solution is;
xi =
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1∆wi + γwj) (A.54)
xj =
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1wj + γ∆wi) . (A.55)
March 22, 2006 38
A.3.2 Wage Bargaining
A.3.2.1 No firm has found the Innovation The firm and the union
bargain simultaneously the wage and employment. Thus, both partners take
the amount of production (i.e. employment) as being fixed during the bar-
gain. Using the same Nash product as in the previous section, we can derive
the first order condition which must hold for the bargained wage:
∂log Ω
∂wi
= δV −1i θ
Vi
(wi − w¯)
+ (1− δ)(pi(xi, xj)− wi)
−1(−1) = 0
⇔ δθ(wi − w¯)
−1 = (1− δ)(pi(xi, xj)− wi)
−1
⇔ (wi − w¯)
1− δ
δθ
= (pi(xi, xj)− wi)
⇔ wi
(
1− δ
δθ
)
= (pi(xi, xj)− wi) +
1− δ
δθ
w¯
⇔ wi (1− δ) = δθ(pi(xi, xj)− wi) + (1− δ)w¯
Using the endogenous demand equation and the expressions for the Nash
equilibrium amounts of production bargained in both firms, yields:
pi − wi = α− xi − γxj − wi
⇔ α−
1
χ21 − γ
2
(
(χ1 − γ)α− χ1wi + γwj + γ(χ1 − γ)α− γχ1wj + γ
2wi
)
− wi
⇔
1
χ21 − γ
2
(
χ21α− γ
2α− (χ1 − γ)(1 + γ)α+ (χ1 − γ
2)wi − (1− χ1)γwj − χ
2
1wi + γ
2wi
)
⇔
1
χ21 − γ
2
(
(χ21 − γ
2 − χ1 − χ1γ + γ + γ
2)α+ (χ1 − γ
2 − χ21 + γ
2)wi + (χ1 − 1)γwj
)
⇔
χ1 − 1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1wi + γwj)
⇔ (χ1 − 1)xi ⇔
1− δ
1− δθ
xi
Plugging this in gives the (wage) reaction in firm i in the situation in which
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no firm has found the innovation.
wi(1− δ) = δθ
1− δ
1− δθ
xi + (1− δ)w¯
⇔ wi =
δθ
1− δθ
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1wi + γwj) + w¯
⇔ wi
(
1 +
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
)
=
δθ
1− δθ
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α+ γwj) + w¯
⇔ wi
(
1 +
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
)
=
δθ
1− δθ
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α+ γwj)
+w¯
(
1 +
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
−
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
)
⇔ wi = w¯ +
δθ
1−δθ
1
χ2
1
−γ2
1 + δθ
1−δθ
χ1
χ2
1
−γ2
(δθ(χ1 − γ)(α− w¯) + δθγ(wj − w¯))
⇔ wi = w¯ +
δθ(χ1 − γ)(α− w¯) + δθγ(wj − w¯)
(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ) + χ1δθ
.
As long as no firm has found the innovation, we have a symmetric equilibrium
in which the bargained wage in both firms in an equilibrium is identical. This
equilibrium wage is given by:
w = wi = wj = w¯ +
δθ(χ1 − γ)(α− w¯)
(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ) + δθ(χ1 − γ)
(A.56)
A.3.2.2 Firm i has found the Innovation
∂log Ω
∂wi
= δV −1i θ
Vi
(wi − w¯)
+ (1− δ)(pi(xi, xj)−∆wi)
−1(−∆) = 0
⇔ δθ(wi − w¯)
−1 = (1− δ)(pi(xi, xj)−∆wi)
−1∆
⇔ ∆wi =
δθ
1− δ
(pi(xi, xj)−∆wi) + ∆w¯
Again it holds that pi(xi, xj)−∆wi = (χ1 − 1)xi =
1−δ
1−δθ
xi. Plugging this in
and using the expression for equilibrium output (A.54) yields the following
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wage reaction function for firm i:
∆wi =
δθ
1− δθ
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1∆wi + γwj) + ∆w¯
⇔ ∆wi
(
1 +
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
)
=
δθ
1− δθ
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α+ γwj) + ∆w¯
⇔ ∆wi
(
1 +
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
)
=
δθ
1− δθ
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α+ γwj)
+∆w¯
(
1 +
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
−
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
)
⇔ ∆wi = ∆w¯ +
δθ
1−δθ
1
χ2
1
−γ2
1 + δθ
1−δθ
χ1
χ2
1
−γ2
((χ1 − γ)(α−∆w¯) + γ(wj −∆w¯))
⇔ ∆wi = ∆w¯ +
δθ(χ1 − γ)(α−∆w¯) + δθγ(wj −∆w¯)
(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ) + χ1δθ
The output reaction curve of firm j does not change as was derived in the
previous section. However, equilibrium output does change in case of firm i
being innovative. This spills-over to the wage bargain. Hence, the reaction
function in factor prices does change.
∂log Ω
∂wj
= δV −1j θ
Vj
(wj − w¯)
+ (1− δ)(pj(xi, xj)− wj)
−1(−1) = 0
⇔ δθ(wj − w¯)
−1 = (1− δ)(pj(xi, xj)− wj)
−1
⇔ wj =
δθ
1− δ
(pj(xi, xj)− wj) + w¯.
In an equilibrium output situation the following holds again (pj(xi, xj) −
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wj) = (χ1 − 1)xj =
1−δ
1−δθ
xj. Using the equilibrium output (A.55) yields:
wj =
δθ
1− δθ
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α− χ1wj + γ∆wi) + w¯
⇔ wj
(
1 +
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
)
=
δθ
1− δθ
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α+ γ∆wi) + w¯
⇔ wj
(
1 +
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
)
=
δθ
1− δθ
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α+ γ∆wi)
+w¯
(
1 +
(
1 +
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
)
−
(
1 +
δθ
1− δθ
χ1
χ21 − γ
2
))
⇔ wj = w¯ +
δθ
1−δθ
1
χ2
1
−γ2
1 + δθ
1−δθ
χ1
χ2
1
−γ2
((χ1 − γ)(α− w¯) + γ(∆wi − w¯))
⇔ wj = w¯ +
δθ(χ1 − γ)(α− w¯) + δθγ(∆wi − w¯)
(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ) + χ1δθ
.
The two factor market reaction functions constitute a system of equations
which determines the Nash equilibrium. This system reads in matrix nota-
tion:(
∆χ2 −δθγ
−δθγ∆ χ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(
wi
wj
)
=
(
(χ1 − γ)δθα+ (χ
2
1 − γ
2)(1− δθ)∆w¯
(χ1 − γ)δθα+ (χ
2
1 − γ
2)(1− δθ)w¯
)
,
where χ2 := (χ
2
1 − γ
2)(1 − δθ) + χ1δθ. The determinant of the matrix B is
given by:
|B| =
(
χ22 − (δθγ)
2
)
∆ > 0. (A.57)
Thus the equilibrium wage in firm i and j in a situation in which firm i has
found the innovation is given by:
wi =
(χ1 − γ)δθ(χ2 + δθγ)
|B|
α+
(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ)(χ2∆+ δθγ)
|B|
w¯ (A.58)
wj =
∆(χ1 − γ)δθ(χ2 + δθγ)
|B|
α+
∆(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ)(χ2 + δθγ∆)
|B|
w¯.
(A.59)
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Not for further reference that in an equilibrium situation the following holds:
γwj − χ1∆wi =
∆(χ1 − γ)δθ(χ2 + δθγ)
|B|
(γ − χ1)α
+
∆(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ)
|B|
(χ2(γ −∆χ1) + δθγ(γ∆− χ1))w¯
(A.60)
and
γ∆wi − χ1wj =
∆(χ1 − γ)δθ(χ2 + δθγ)
|B|
(γ − χ1)α
+
∆(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ)
|B|
(χ2(γ∆− χ1) + δθγ(γ − χ1∆))w¯.
(A.61)
A.3.3 Non-Drastic Innovation
As in the situation with right-to-manage, a non-drastic innovations implies
that the output of the loosing firm remains positive. Hence, the condition
for a non-drastic innovation reads:
xj =
1
χ21 − γ
2
((χ1 − γ)α+ γ∆wi − χ1wj) > 0 (A.62)
⇔ (χ1 − γ)α− (χ1 − γ)
∆(χ1 − γ)δθ(χ2 + δθγ)
|B|
α
+
∆(χ21 − γ
2)(1− δθ)
|B|
(χ2(γ∆− χ1) + δθγ(γ − χ1∆))w¯ > 0
(A.63)
